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matively extended this doctrine to the area of everyday business compe-
tition where a contracting party's competitor has attempted to appro-
priate the plaintiff's contract rights for himself.40
R. G. HALL, JR.
Criminal Law-Search Warrants-Extension of the Law in
North Carolina
In North Carolina, search warrants are authorized by statute to issue
for the seizure of the following objects: (1) stolen property; (2) false
or counterfeit coins, notes, bills, or bonds, and instruments used for
counterfeiting them; (3) any personal property, tickets, books, papers,
and documents used in connection with and in the operation of lotteries,
gaming, and gambling;1 (4) liquor illegally possessed for the purpose
of sale ;2 (5) deserting seamen ;3 (6) game taken in violation of the game
laws ;4 and (7) re-used bottles.5 A search warrant may not issue for
any object not covered by statute,6 and its availability may not be ex-
tended by construction to any case not clearly covered by statute.7
At common law, facts discovered by illegal searches and seizures
could be used in evidence.8 In 1913, State v. Wallace9 recognized that
" A party is liable for any intentional, unprivileged interference with con-
tractual relations of others. Jasperson v. Dominion Tobacco Co., (1923) A. C.
709, L. R 92 P. C. 190. See also Philadelphia Record Co. v. Leopold, 40 F. Supp.
346, 348 (S. D. N. Y. 1941) (principle applicable to inducement to "tender spurious
performance," where professional puzzle solvers sold contestants answers to plain-
tiff's puzzle series, where the contestants were under no contractual obligation to
perform).
For a detailed study of the whole subject of liability for procuring breach of
contract see Annotation, 84 A. L. R 43 ; Annotation, 26 A. L. R. 2d 1227; Carpen-
ter, Interfereice with Contractual Relations, 41 HARv. L. REv. 728 (1928) ; Sayre,
Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 HARv. L. REv. 663 (1923).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. § 15-25 (1953). 'N. C. GEN. STAT. § 18-13 (1953).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. §14-351 (1953). 'N. C. GEN. STAT. § 113-91(d) (1952).
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 80-28 (1950).
' "Ordinarily even the strong arm of the law may not reach across the threshold
of one's dwelling and invade the sacred precinct of his home except under authority
of a search warrant issued in accord with pertinent statutory provisions." I re
Walters, 229 N. C. 111, 113, 47 S. E. 2d 709, 710 (1948) ; People ex rel. Simpson
Co. v. Kempner, 208 N. Y. 16, 101 N. E. 794 (1913) ; State v. Mann, 27 N. C. 45(1844) ; MACHEN, THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SEizuaz § 2(1950) ; cf. Ltr. of Atty.
Gen. of N. C. to Mr. J. K. Morris, 22 July 1952 ("It is seriously doubted if a
search warrant would be the proper method of searching a tourist camp which is
suspected of operating for immoral purposes.").
" Rose v. St. Clair, 28 F. 2d 189 (D. C. 1928) ; State v. Certain Contraceptive
Materials, 126 Conn. 428, 11 A. 2d 863 (1940) ; State ex rel. Wilson v. Quigg, 154
Fla. 348, 17 So. 2d 697 (1944) ; Powell v. State, 65 Okla. Cr. 221, 84 P. 2d 442
(1938) ; 47 Am. JuR. Searches and Seizures § 14 (1938).
' State v. McGee, 214 N. C. 184, 198 S. E. 616 (1938).
9 162 N. C. 623, 631, 78 S. E. 1, 4 (1913). The court approved the following
statement of the rule: "It may be mentioned in this place that though papers and
other subjects of evidence may have been illegally taken from the possession of
the party against whom they are offered, or otherwise unlawfully obtained, this is
no valid objection to their admissibility if they are pertinent to the issue. The
court will not take notice how they were obtained, whether lawfully or unlawfully,
nor will it form an issue to determine that question."
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rule as existing in North Carolina. Under that doctrine, evidence seized
by officers either under an invalid search warrant or without any search
warrant could be admitted in evidence at trial, and the -defendant would
then be left to his right of civil action against the trespassing officer.10
Furthermore, under this doctrine it followed that evidence for which the
statute did not authorize a warrant to issue (e.g., burglar tools or mur-
der weapons) could be used in evidence when seized by means of an
illegal search. An act of the General Assembly of 193711 altered this
rule by providing that no facts discovered by means of an "illegal" search
warrant could be used as evidence in the trial of any action. The statu-
tory context of the word "illegal" indicates that it connotes a procedural
defect in the warrant, such as the failure of the investigating officer to
sign an affidavit under oath, or the failure of the magistrate to examine
him in regard thereto before issuing the warrant.1 2  Thus if a search
warrant were issued upon affidavit under oath and examination to
authorize a search for narcotics, although there is no statutory authority
for the issuance of such a warrant, quere as to whether any evidence
discovered under such a warrant would not be admissible under the com-
mon law in spite of the 1937 amendment. In 1938, the Supreme Court
in State v. McGee'3 pointed out the ineffectiveness of the 1937 amend-
ment in changing the common law rule admitting evidence obtained by
illegal search and seizure. This decision held that since the 1937 amend-
ment made no mention of articles seized in an unlawful search conducted
without any warrant at all, evidence so obtained was still admissible.
Then in 1951, the search warrant law was further amended by adding
the following proviso:
Provided, no facts discovered or evidence obtained without a legal
search warrant in the course of any search, made under conditions
requiring the issuance of a search warrant, shall be competent as
evidence in the trial of any action.14
As for objects set out in the statutes for which search warrants are
authorized to issue, it is clear that they may not be presented in evidence
where they are discovered under an "illegal" search warrant or without
" Riley v. Stone, 174 N. C. 588, 94 S. E. 434 (1917) ; Cohoon v. Speed, 47 N. C.
133 (1885).
N. C. Pub. Laws 1937, c. 339, § 12 (now N. C. GEar. STAT. § 15-27 [1953]).
12 "Any officer who shall sign and issue or cause to be signed and issued a search
warrant without first requiring the complainant or other person to sign an affidavit
under oath and examining said person or complainant in regard thereto shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor; and no facts discovered by reason of such illegal warrant
shall be competent as evidence in the trial of any action. ... ." N. C. GEN. STAT.§ 15-27 (1953); see State v. Rhodes, 233 N. C. 453, 455, 64 S. E. 2d 287, 289(1951).
1214 N. C. 184, 198 S. E. 616 (1938) (held, that the amendment constituted a
modification and not an abrogation of the common law rule).
1" N. C. Sess. Laws 1951, c. 644, § 1 (now N. C. GEN. STAT. § 15-27 [1953]).
19531
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
any search warrant "where one is required." Quere as to the admissi-
bility of evidence obtained by a search made with or without a search
warrant in a case where no search warrant is authorized by statute; e.g.,
a search for instruments used in the commission of a felony, or for nar-
cotics.' 5 The wording of the provision might be construed to mean
that the statute contemplates only those situations where a warrant m1ay
issue, and not those situations where there is no provision for the issu-
ance of a search warrant.16
Under the North Carolina law therefore, search warrants may not
issue for property used in the commission of general felonies not covered
by the existing statutes, or for illegal narcotics. Thus if an officer were
to take it upon himself to search a suspect's home without a search war-
rant, for instruments used in the commission of a murder and found the
murder weapon, it is possible that the court would follow either of two
courses of action in ruling on the admissibility of the evidence. The
court might consider that the evidence was the result of an illegal search
where a search warrant is required and was therefore inadmissible; or,
on the other hand, the court might apply the common law doctrine to
such a case and admit the evidence, leaving the defendant to his civil
remedy. Since the passage of the 1951 amendment, the court has not
been called upon to decide whether the common law doctrine admitting
evidence obtained by illegal searches and seizures has been completely
abrogated in North Carolina. In either of the above two instances, it
would seem that the effective detection and prevention of crime is ham-
pered in this State by the fact that our search warrant law does not make
provision for issuance of search warrants to search for property used
in the commission of a felony or for narcotics.
A survey of the search warrant laws of the several states reveals that
fifteen states17 provide for the issuance of search warrants to search for
" Also, quere as to the admissibility of evidence obtained by an lotreasonable
search under a legal search warrant.8 "The courts determine the competency of evidence irrespective of the method
by which it was procured. An objection to an offer of proof made on the trial of
a cause raises no other question than that of its competency, relevancy and mate-
riality. On such objection the court cannot enter on the trial of a collateral issue
as to the source from which the evidence was obtained, unless expressly required
so to do by statute." State v. McGee, 214 N. C. 184, 186, 198 S. E. 616, 617 (1938).
" AIA. CODE tit. 15, § 101 (1940); ARiz. CODE ANN. § 44-3501 (1939); CAL.
PEN. CODE § 1524 (1949); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-4402 (1947) ; IOWA CODE ANN.
c. 36, § 751.3 (1950) ; LA. Rxv. STAT. § 15:43 (1950); MD. ANN. CoDE GEN. LAws
art. 27, § 328 (1951) ; MONT. Rav. CODES ANN. § 301-2 (1947) ; NEY. Ray. STAT.§ 29-801 (1943) ; N. Y. CRIMINAL CODE AND PENAL LAW § 792 (1945) ; N. D. REV.
CODE § 29-2902 (1943); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1222 (1947); ORE COMP.
LAws ANN. § 26-1702 (1940) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 11898 (Williams 1934); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-54-2 (1953) (A search warrant may be issued for property "(2)
When it was used as the means of committing a felony; in which case it may be
taken on the warrant from any place in which it is concealed, from any person in
whose possession it may be.").
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property used in the commission of a felony. Five states", authorize
the issuance of a warrant to search for property used in the commission
of a misdemeanor or a felony. Federal Rules' 9 authorize the issuance
of a search warrant for property "designed or intended for use or which
is or has been used as the means of committing a criminal offense." Ten
of the fifteen states allowing the issuance of a search warrant for property
used in the commission of a felony have an additional provision provid-
ing that search warrants may issue for property:
when it is in the possession of any person with the intent to use it
as the means of committing a public offense, or in the possession
of another to whom he may have delivered it for the purpose of
concealing it or preventing its being discovered, in which case it
may be taken on the warrant from such person, or from any place
occupied by him or under his control, or from the possession of
the person to whom he may have delivered it.
20
The Uniform Narcotics Act of North Carolina 2' makes adequate
provision for the punishment of violations of the Act and for seizure of
the contraband and vehicles used in its transportation. It seems that
an important means of enforcement is being withheld from the law en-
forcement officers of the state, however, in that there is no provision made
for the issuance of a search warrant to search places where it is suspected
that illegal traffic in narcotics is being carried on. A search of the perti-
nent statutes of the states reveals that thirteen states22 have specific
" FLA. STAT. ANN. § 993.02 (2) (a) (1941); OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. § 13430-1
(Supp. 1952) ; VT. REV. STAT. § 2447 (1947) ; Wis. STAT. § 363.02 (1951) ; Wyo.
Comp. STAT. AN. § 10-201 (1945).1 Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(b)(2) (1951).
20 Amiz. CODE ANN. § 44-3501(3) (1939); CAL. PEN. CODE § 1524(3) (1949);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-4402(3) (1947); IOWA CODE ANN. c. 36, § 7513(3)
(1950) ; MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 301-2(3) (1947) ; N. Y. CRIMINAL CODE AND
PENAL LAW §792(3) (1945); N. D. REv. CODE §2902(3) (1943); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 22, § 1222(3) (1947); ORE. Comp. LAWS ANN. §26-1702(3) (1940); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-54-2(3) (1953).
2N N. C. GEN. STAT. § 90-86 et seq. (1950).22FLA. STAT. ANN. § 933.02(3) (1941) ; LA. REv. STAT. § 15:43 (1950) ; MASS.
ANN. LAWS c. 94. § 214 (1946) ; MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 1053 (1937) ; MINN. STAT.
§ 618.12 (1945) ; Miss. CODE ANN. § 6837 (1952) ; N. H. REV. LAWS c. 424, § 1
(1942); N. M. STAT. ANN. §721 (VIII) (1941); TEx. CODE ClIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 725b(16) (1925) ; UTAH CODE Am. § 58-13-29 (1953) ; W. VA. CODE ANN.
§1385(19) (1949); Wis. STAT. §363.02(7) (1951); Wyo. Comp. STAT. ANN.
§ 46-214 (1945) ("It shall be lawful for any Justice of the Peace to issue search
warrants to search any building, house, premises, place, automobile, conveyance, or
person, for any of the drugs mentioned in this act [§§ 46-201 to 46-224]. Provided,
however, that no warrant for such search shall be issued except upon probable
cause and when there shall have been filed with the Justice a complaint in writing
under oath, particularly describing the building, house, premises, place, automobile,
conveyance, thing or person to be searched, the person to be seized, and alleging
substantially the offense in relation thereto, and that the complainant verily be-
lives that drugs mentioned in this Act are kept in violation of law, or so concealed
on such person, or in or about the place or thing to be searched.. .."' Ibid.
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statutes authorizing search warrants relative to the enforcement of their
narcotics law. It is also possible, of course, that search warrants may
be issued in other states to search for narcotics, if the state has a statute
authorizing the issuance of warrants to search for property "used in the
commission of a felony."
In order to help remove the doubt concerning the admissibility of
evidence obtained without a search warrant in cases where no warrant
may issue, and further, to aid the law enforcement officers of our State
more effectively to enforce our laws in a legal manner, it is submitted
that the search warrant statute, G. S. § 15-25,23 should be amended to
allow the issuance of search warrants for property used in the commis-
sion of a felony ;24 and that the Uniform Narcotics Act, G. S. § 90_110,25
should be amended to allow the issuance of search warrants to search
for narcotics being held or possessed in violation of the narcotics law of
North Carolina.20
ELTON C. PRIDGEN
Federal Tort Claims Act-Discretionary Functions Exception
On June 8, 1953, the Supreme Court of the United States, in Dalehite
v. United States,' affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
5th Circuit in the Texas City disaster cases.2 The District Court for
the Southern District of Texas had found for the plaintiffs, and that
judgment had been reversed and rendered for the United States by the
court of appeals. Leave to file a petition for rehearing was denied on
November 9, 1953.3
22N. C. GEN. STAT. § 15-25 (1953).
-' The Federal cases distinguish between evidence of the offense being carried
on and the instruments or fruits of the crime. Thus searches of one's house, office,
papers, or effects merely to get evidence to convict him of crime is considered a
violation of the self-incrimination prohibition; but searches for and seizure of
stolen property, counterfeit coins, burglar's tools, illicit liquor and gambling ap-
paratus is considered proper under the Federal law. U. S. v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S.
452 (1932).
-
5 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 90-110 (1950).
20 "The use of the search warrant to prevent and detect crime is a valid exercise
of the police power of the state. The constitutional provisions have no application
to reasonable rules and regulations adopted in the exercise of the police power for
the protection of the public health, morals, and welfare." 47 Am. JuR. Searches and
Seizures § 13 (1938).
-73 S. Ct. 956 (1953). Mr. Justice Reed delivered the prevailing opinion. Mr.
Justice Clark and Mr. Justice Roberts took no part in the case. Mr. Justice Jack-
son submitted a dissenting opinion in which Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice
Frankfurter concurred.2 In re Texas City Disaster Litigation, 197 F. 2nd 771 (5th Cir. 1952). Three
of the six judges, while agreeing with the decision to reverse the judgment of the
district court, dissented from the decision to render judgment for the United States,
being of opinion that the facts alleged in the complaint set up grounds for relief
and that the cause should have been remanded for a new trial.
'The litigants now, of course, attempt to secure remedy through special Con-
gressional legislation.
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